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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been vastly employed in the 
collection and transmission of data via wireless networks. This type of 
network is nowadays used in many applications for surveillance 
activities in various environments due to its low cost and easy 
communications. In these networks, the sensors use a limited power 
source which after its depletion, since it is non-renewable, network 
lifetime ends. Due to the weaknesses in sensor nodes, they are vulnerable 
to many threats. One notable attack threating WSN is Denial of Sleep 
(DoS). DoS attacks denotes the loss of energy in these sensors by keeping 
the nodes from going into sleep and energy-saving mode. In this paper, 
the Abnormal Sensor Detection Accuracy (ASDA-RSA) method is 
utilised to counteract DoS attacks to reducing the amount of energy 
consumed. The ASDA-RSA schema in this paper consists of two phases 
to enhancement security in the WSNs. In the first phase, a clustering 
approach based on energy and distance is used to select the proper cluster 
head and in the second phase, the RSA cryptography algorithm and 
interlock protocol are used here along with an authentication method, to 
prevent DoS attacks. Moreover, ASDA-RSA method is evaluated here 
via extensive simulations carried out in NS-2. The simulation results 
indicate that the WSN network performance metrics are improved in 
terms of average throughput, Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), network 
lifetime, detection ratio, and average residual energy. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
Networks constructed with multiple sensors enables novel applications covering a wide range of areas. 
However, it is well-known that networks forming from a range of sensors are prone to factors threatening 
their security [1-4].  
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     Security is a main research topic in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The widespread application 
of WSNs in security sensitive environment, such as military environment, made security considerations 
a basic requirement. Since nodes are the routing medium in the network, attacking the nodes eradicate 
the network. As routing is a trust-based operation among the nodes, there exists a good opportunity for 
attackers to disorder the routing process. These networks are usually formed without pre-planning and 
are utilised for a short period; hence, security investigations in these networks are carried out separately. 
Therefore, it is necessary to implement countermeasures to protect the WSN from security attacks. 
Denial of Sleep (DoS) attack [5-11] is one of the most notable form of attacks in network sensors. DoS 
refrains the radio from moving into sleep mode to completely drain its battery. In normal operating 
conditions, energy consumption ratio in sensors drains their battery in months, whereas denial of sleep 
attack drains them in a few days by keeping the radio transmitter system on the sensor nodes on [1, 12-
15].  
     In this paper, we proposed a multistage method called ASDA-RSA, as follows: 1) dividing the 
network into clusters. This stage is carried out using an energy (and distance) based approach for 
selecting the appropriate cluster head, to improve the network and optimize energy consumption. 2) 
Using RSA algorithm and interlocking protocol, along with an authentication method, to prevent the 
DoS attack. Figure 1 demonstrate an example of DoS attack in WSNs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 WSNs with DoS attack [16].  
 
 
    The paper presented here is organized as the following. Section 2 presents the related works on 
approaches defending the system against Denial of Sleep attack. In section 3, cryptography algorithms 
for WSN are presented. In Section 4, the details of our proposed ASDA-RSA method is discussed. 
Moreover, parameters utilised for performance evaluation are investigated and simulation results are 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, the paper is concluded.  
 
 
2   RELATED WORK 
Numerous studies have developed and employed a variety of security measurements to address Denial 
of Sleep attacks, and secure WSNs from DoS attacks. This is not a recent problem and has been 
previously studied extensively. There exist various techniques proposed by researchers to deal with 
such attacks.  
     In [17], the mechanisms considered in WSN MAC systems that act as countermeasures against 
attacks that target MAC layers in WSNs are studied. Therefore, a secure hybrid MAC mechanism 
entitled “Green and Secure Hybrid Medium Access Control (GSHMAC)” is proposed here to mitigate 
the effects such attacks have on WSN MAC systems. Threshold-based MAC mode collision control 
and countermeasures on WSN MAC systems with the help of internal MAC mechanisms, are instances 
of features provided within this mechanism. 
    In [18], through inspiration from the immune system of the human, an IDS framework is proposed 
to be applied to the context of the wireless sensor networks. A revised decentralized and customized 
version of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm is employed in this algorithm to provide nodes with capabilities 
such as neighborhood monitoring and collaboration towards identifying intruders. Moreover, to 
demonstrate the efficiency in terms of denial-of-sleep attack detection as well as energy consumption, 
the results are compared with a Negative Selection Theory implementation. 
     Two major contributions are offered in [19]. First, the existing defense mechanisms for the denialof-
sleep attacks in ContikiMAC are tailored to CSL, due to the superiority of CSL over ContikiMAC. 
Second, several enhancements in security are proposed for the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms 
against denial-of-sleep. As demonstrated, the defensive mechanisms we proposed for CSL against 
denial-of-sleep reduce the number of denial-of-sleep attacks drastically, while enabling protection 
against a larger range of denial-of-sleep attacks compared to the existing defensive mechanism in 
ContikiMAC. 
     The vulnerabilities existing in MAC solutions as well as embeddable mechanisms to provide 
inherent security are the main focus of this paper [20]. Specifically, we investigate scenarios of physical 
jamming in which, attackers prevent communication establishment and thus, result in repetitive 
retransmissions as well as additional duty for the target devices. Prior to focusing on technologies in 
communication that are investigated by a number of main standardization bodies, numerous existing 
attacks are investigated in detail. Moreover, time-synchronized and channel hopping (TSCH) networks, 
which are designed for industrial wireless devices, are considered. The solutions provided result in 
collision risks minimization and idle listening reduction, while providing cryptographic suites to 
guarantee additional authentication and encryption. 
     To detect DoS attack in WSNs, a mathematical model is developed in [21] based on absorbing 
Markov chain, where the sensor nodes were detected using the Markov chain model. Using this model, 
attacks are identified by considering the expected time of death in sensor networks with a common 
scenario. 
     In [22], a distributed cooperation-based hierarchical framework is employed to detect denial of sleep 
attack in WSNs. This technique provides an efficient heterogeneous wireless sensor network with 
reliable performance by detecting anomalies in two stages, to minimise the likelihood of improper 
intrusions. To reduce the risk of attack, this study isolates the networks from malicious nodes to deny 
receiving fake packets. 
     Compact hierarchical model stated in [23] is used in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks to 
detect sleepless nodes affected by the attack. In this method, a cluster based on effective energy is used 
to create a five-layer hierarchical network to increase its scalability and longevity. In this approach, 
energy efficiency has been achieved by minimising the number of active sensors. Moreover, the 
designed dynamic model protects the sensor nodes from sudden death. This model uses an intrusion 
detection system through power analysis responsible for detecting tasks. Anomaly detection method is 
employed in approaches to avoid intrusion detection. 
     The swarm based defensive technique proposed in [24] copes with denial of sleep attacks by 
employing anomaly detection model to determine the traffic impact among sensor nodes. Ant factors 
are used as swarm information to collect oscillation and communication frequency. The faulty channel 
is detected according to the frequency of the oscillation; and when the node is isolated, data is achieved, 
and the faulty channel is removed. 
     In [25], intrusion detection system detects the malicious node in an isolation table based on the 
attack behaviour. The sensor node behaviour is compared against the attack behaviour to specify 
abnormal information. If the node performance became abnormal, it is separated and registered in the 
isolation table. In Isolation Table Intrusion Detection System (ITIDS), sensor nodes are responsible for 
monitoring each other and detecting denial of sleep attack. 
     Storm control mechanism defined in [26] is utilized to reduce data flooding and avoid denial of 
sleep attacks. The system tracks the frequency of the packets received, and when the expected 
frequency configuration is exceeded, the node alerts the base station and shuts down its wireless 
receiver for a pre-defined period of time. 
     A two-tier system based on a secure transmission scheme (CrossLayer) is proposed in [27]. In the 
proposed scheme, a hash-chain is employed for generating dynamic session keys for symmetric 
encryption key and performing mutual authentication. This scheme requires only some simple and fast 
computations in dynamic session key for hash functions, such as MD5 or SHA-1. Since this scheme is 
integrated with MAC protocol, no extra packets exists in comparison with the current MAC designs. 
Moreover, detailed energy distribution analysis reveals a potentially novel decision rule to compromise 
the energy conservation and security scheme trade-off. 
     In [28], proposed two optimizations to Contiki MAC. The dozing optimization, on the one hand, 
significantly reduces the energy consumption under ding-dong ditching. Beyond that, the dozing 
optimization helps during normal operation as it reduces the energy consumption of true wake ups, too. 
The secure phase-lock optimization, on the other hand, is a version of Contiki MAC’s phase-lock 
optimization that resists pulse-delay attacks. Additionally, the secure phase-lock optimization makes 
ContikiMAC resilient to collision attacks, as well as more energy efficient. 
     In [29], Gunasekaran et al. suggested a denial of sleep attack detection (GA-DoSLD) algorithm 
based on an efficient Genetic Algorithm (GA) scheme to analyse the nodes unnormal behaviour in the 
nodes. In their suggested algorithm, a Modified-RSA (MRSA) algorithm is implemented in the base 
station (BS) to generate and distribute key pairs amongst the sensor nodes. Prior to transmitting the 
packets, an optimal route using AODV protocol is determined in the sensor nodes. Following 
determining the optimal route, the trustworthiness of the relay node is ensured using fitness calculation. 
     Keerthana and Padmavathi [30] suggested an Enhanced Particle Swarm Optimization (EPSO) 
technique for detecting the sinkhole attacks in WSN. When compared to the existing ACO and PSO 
algorithms, the suggested algorithm provided optimal packet delivery ratio, message drop, average 
delay, and false alarm rate. 
     In [31], a two-phase system is proposed to detect wormhole attacks and protect in the MANET, 
DAWA. The proposed methodology is comprised of two phases. Initially, the efficient routes are 
selected in the system via fuzzy logic; then, artificial immune system is utilized to identify the immune 
route in the selected routes. In this paper, constructing the wormhole tunnels using out-of-band high 
power channels results in efficient wormhole attacks identification. However, there is a prerequisite 
consideration in this paper that when the destination nodes are affected by wormhole attacks, they do 
not receive any packets, which is necessarily not true. 
     A transmission/reception device with wake-up radio for a node with limited resources such as an 
IoT network node. The device includes a permanently powered auxiliary circuit, capable of detecting 
a wake-up token, and the main circuit, normally in the idle state and activated by the auxiliary circuit 
when a wake-up token is detected. The next wake-up token is calculated by the main circuit by applying 
a one-way function to at least part of a message exchanged on the main radio through a secure 
communication [59]. 
     In [60], the authors investigated existing studies and provided a systematic review of EDAs and 
defenses in LPW networks. This paper also indicated the security challenges in LPW networks related 
to EDAs along with the potential research directions. While LPW technologies have already hit the 
market with the promising deployment schedules, our attempt can inspire the research community to 
enhance the security of underlying protocols that will shape the connectivity of billions of devices in 
the future IoT ecosystem. 
     In [61], authors addressed the problem of secure data transmission and balanced energy consumption 
in an unattended wireless sensor network (UWSN) comprising of multiple static source nodes and a 
mobile sink in the presence of adversaries. The proposed system comprises of three phases: the 
identification of data collection points (convex nodes), path planning by the mobile sink, and secure 
data transmission. An energy-aware convex hull algorithm is used for the identification of data 
collection points for data transmission to the mobile sink. Data are securely transmitted through elliptic 
curve cryptography based ElGamal scheme for message authentication. A data packet is associated 
with a digital signature. 
     Wireless sensor networks which form part of the core for the Internet of Things consist of resource 
constrained sensors that are usually powered by batteries. Therefore, careful energy awareness is 
essential when working with these devices. However, the absence of security protection could give 
room for energy-drain attacks such as denial-of-sleep attacks which has a higher negative impact on 
the life span (availability) of the sensors than the presence of security techniques. This paper focuses 
on denial-of-sleep attacks by simulating three Media Access Control (MAC) protocols - Sensor-MAC, 
Timeout-MAC, and TunableMAC - under different network sizes. We evaluate, compare, and analyse 
the received signal strength and the link quality indicators for each of these protocols [62]. 
 
 
3   Cryptography Algorithms for WSN 
Many schemes based on public-key cryptography are investigated. Those algorithms are DES1, 3-
DES2, AES3, Blowfish, and RSA4. This paper consists of RSA algorithm, which can be used for key 
distribution and decrypting the message. 
 
 
3.1    DES Algorithm 
The DES algorithm encrypts data with a length of 64 using a 56bit key and uses the remaining 8 bits 
for checking the parity. This algorithm is a symmetric block encryption algorithm and uses the Feistel 
 
1 Data Encryption Standard 
2 Triple DES 
3 Advanced Encryption Standard 
4 Rivest Shamir Adelman 
cipher property. This algorithm includes 16 round and each round is called a cycle. This means that 
its main algorithm gets repeated 16 times in order to generate the encrypted data. The advantage this 
algorithm has is that due to its low-key length, encryption and decryption is done with higher speed. 
However, because of the low length of the key and its easier decryption by perpetrators, it was not 
welcomed and the AES algorithm replaced it as the security standard. 
 
 
 
3.2    3-DES Algorithm 
The 3DES algorithm, which is symmetric, uses three keys and three repetitions of the DES algorithm. 
The function follows an encryption-decryption-encryption (EDE) sequence. 3DES has a key with a 
168bits length. This algorithm has been carefully studied during its time more than any other 
algorithm and no vulnerability other than the meet-in-the-middle attack has been discovered. 
Therefore, there is high confidence in the resistance of the 3DES algorithm against password 
discovery. The main problem with this algorithm is that first, it is weak in terms of software and 
second, it has three times as many executive operations as the DES algorithm and therefore, it will 
definitely be slower. The second problem is that 3DES uses a data block with a 64bit length. Because 
of these problems, it was seen in the long term that 3DES is not a logical candidate. Finally, AES 
replaces 3DES which has a significant efficiency and security capability. 
 
 
 
3.3    AES Algorithm 
This algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm which uses the same key for encryption and 
decryption. AES encrypts data in 128bit block and uses 128bit, 192bit, or 256bit keys. The main 
attack in the case of AES is related to the management of the encryption key. In case of weakness in 
the management and maintenance of this key, it will be possible to steal it and access the information. 
This algorithm is a method for the encryption of digital data and has replaced the digital encryption 
standard (DES). The AES standard is based on a design principle called substitution permutation 
network and is quick both on software and hardware. AES is a block cipher algorithm but unlike the 
DES standard, it does not use the Feistel cipher. In each round, AES uses the data block in parallel 
and performs the substitution and relocation on it. The size of the key used in AES determines the 
number of conversion cycles which converts the input named plaintext to the output named 
ciphertext. 
 
 
 
3.4    Blowfish Algorithm 
This algorithm is an encryption method which has been based on a cipher key and a fast and 
symmetric block cipher. It is easily implemented on fast 32bit processors and needs less than 5k of 
memory. Blowfish presents a good encryption rate in software and to this date, no effective 
cryptanalysis has been discovered on it. The length of the block used in this algorithm is 64bits while 
the length of the key is variable in this algorithm and can be from 3 to 448 bits. This algorithm consists 
of two sections: key expansion and data encryption. Key expansion transforms a key of variable 
length (56 bytes maximum) to an array of several subkeys with an overall size of 4168 bytes. The 
encryption step has 16 rounds. Each round consists of a permutation, based on the key and another 
permutation, based on the key and data. This algorithm, by accepting a public key with a length of 
32 to 448 is much faster than other methods like DES and is a good alternative. Also, by having a 
variable key length and increasing it, brute force attack is impossible on this algorithm. 
 
 
 
3.5    RSA Algorithm 
Employing encryption based on privacy homomorphic provides simultaneous end-to-end 
confidentiality and data aggregation. Two instances of privacy homomorphism are called additive 
PH and multiplicative PH [32]. An additive homomorphic encryption algorithm supports additive 
operations on encrypted data without the need to decrypt any individual data. i.e.
. ( ) ( ) ( ).ie E x y E x E y+ = +  Operation expenses for additive PH is less than multiplicative PH, hence it is 
more suitable to utilise in wireless sensor networks [32]. On the other hand, a multiplicative 
homomorphic supports multiplicative operations over encrypted data without the need to decrypt 
individual data. . ( * ) ( )* ( ).ie E x y E x E y=  Privacy homomorphic supporting cryptographic algorithms are 
divided into two categories: symmetric PHs [33], Asymmetric PH/public key encryption. RSA 
cryptography algorithms is described as follows: 
 
 
3.5.1  Key generation steps of RSA 
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code for generating RSA. 
 
 
Public Key is ( ),m : public key is available to both cluster members and CH.  
Private Key is ( ),di m : private key is available to sink or base only. 
 
3.5.2  Encryption 
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code for Encryption Key. 
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code for RSA Key generation 
1: Initialization: 
2: Procedure Key generation 
3: Step 1: Choice 2 large prime numbers S  and R , where S R . 
4: Step 2: Compute the value of m . 
5:                                      * ,  m S R n=  will be used as the modulus for both public and private keys 
6: Step 3: Find the totient of ( ),m m   
7: Step 4: Evaluate         ( ) ( )1 1 .( )m S R = −  −   
8: Step 5: Choose an integer e in such a way that ( )1 i m   , and in such a way that i  and  ( )m  no divisors other than 
9:                          ( )( ),   1.gcd i m =   
10: Step 6: Compute the value of di based on relation, 
11:                          ( )1  di k m +   
12:                           keep di  as a private key. 
13: End Procedure 
 
 
3.5.3  Decryption 
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code for Decryption Key. 
 
 
 
4    Abnormal Sensor Detection Accuracy (ASDA-RSA) 
In the following section, we design a Denial of Sleep-immune schema by employing the RSA algorithm 
and the interlock protocol.  
 
4.1   System architecture 
The wireless sensor network in the proposed ASDA-RSA consists of nodes distributed randomly. Fig. 
2 illustrates the base station and node positions our proposed ASDA-RSA architecture. We consider 
the following specifications for our proposed network: 
• All nodes are fixed and the base station receives information from the head cluster.  
• The BS is connected to the Internet. 
• All nodes are homogeneous and are bound or restricted in energy. 
• The nodes are not aware of their position. But each node can calculate its own distance with another 
node according to the received message signal strength. 
• The nodes continuously sense the surrounding environment and send the relevant data at a constant 
rate. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Base station and nodes position 
 
Algorithm 2 Pseudo code for RSA Encryption Key 
1: Initialization: 
2: Procedure Encryption 
3: Step1: Sensor nodes have public key ( ),  i m  [ i  is public] 
4: Step2: 
^( ) mod ( )    Cf M i m=  . 
6: Step3: The packet is encrypted 
13: End Procedure 
Algorithm 3 Pseudo code for RSA Decryption Key 
1: Initialization: 
2: Procedure Decryption 
3: Step1: Base Station (BS) has private key ( ),  di m  [ di  is private key] 
4: Step2: 
^( ) mod   ( ) M Cf di m=  . 
6: Step3:  The packet is decrypted 
13: End Procedure 
4.2      The Model for Energy Consumption 
Major energy consumption in WSNs is to perform sensing, processing the data, and communication. 
In this paper, first order ratio model is utilised as the energy consumption model, and energy 
consumption is considered for data communication only. Relative to the sender and receiver nodes 
distance ( di ), energy consumption will be modelled as a free space or a multipath fading channel. In 
Eq. (6) [34], the amount of energy consumed to transmitT  bits of data to distance di  is demonstrated: 
2
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(6) 
 
In this equation, elecE  is the amount of energy required to activate the circuits, mpi  and fsi  are relay 
activation energy model for multi-path channels and empty space, respectively, 2di  denotes the power 
loss in free space, while power loss in multipath fading is 4di .  Currently, there is a great deal of 
research in the area of low energy radios. In our work, we assume a simple model where the radio 
dissipates 100 /elecE nJ bit= in the transmit or receive circuitry and 
40.0015 / /mpi pJ bit m = for the transmit 
amplifier.  
Simulated parameter is set as: 2
4
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Furthermore, 0di  Eq. (6), which is a constant value, is calculated according to Eq. (7) [34]: 
0
fs
mp
di


=  
(7) 
Plus, the necessary energy to receive T  bits of data is as demonstrated in Eq. (8) [34]: 
( , ) *Rx elecE T di T E=  (8) 
 
It is assumed that every cluster head receives a single packet from its cluster members in each 
communication period. Once all packets are received, the useful information are combined into a single 
packet in the cluster head and are reported to the sink via a multi-hopping communication. The amount 
of energy consumed to combine data at each cluster head node is calculated according to Eq. (9): 
* *vEda NM k EDA=  (9) 
 
Where vNM  is the members’ count in the cluster head v , and EDA  is the combination cost per data 
bit [34]. 
 
4.3      Cluster Head Election in the Proposed ASDA-RSA 
Every node in wireless sensor networks have certain energy levels and possess certain geographic 
coordinates. Regarding the characteristics of such networks and the significance of their energy, if a 
network node can be selected as a head cluster to decrease the required space compared to the sink, and 
consumes more energy, then the network would have a longer life span. To aggregate the data on a given 
network, it is better to analyse the data individually in each node, and transmit the results to the cluster 
head in order to reduce computation burden for each cluster head. In sensor networks, if the node count 
is less than five, clustering is not mandatory, and data are transmitted directly to the sink. In our proposed 
ASDA-RSA method, appropriate cluster head to collect data is selected initially. The steps to select the 
cluster head is as the following: 
 
Step 1:  First, it is best to select a node closer to the base station. Euclidean Eq. (1) is employed for 
this. The nodes in the network are all assumed to be equipped with a Global Positioning System 
(GPS), and is aware of its geographic location. 
 
2 2( . ) ( ) ( )i s i sI S x x x x= − + −  
(1) 
 
Where I  is the coordinates of each node, while S  is the sink coordinate. 
 
Step 2: Next, the nodes that are more energy-efficient among the selected nodes, and are closest to 
the base station are more suitable for the cluster heads. According to Eq. (2), the energy of the nodes 
are measured as the following: 
 
e
Q
t
=  
(2) 
Where e  represents the node initial energy in kilojoules, while t  is the time parameter in minutes. Eq. 
(2) can be rewritten by converting the values in terms of Jules and seconds (in the first round all nodes 
have homogeneous and identical energies). 
 
Step 3: Following calculating the energy for the nodes, and determining the nodes and the base station 
distance, Eq. (3) is employed to select the cluster head. 
 
* ( . )i ir e d I S=  (3) 
 
In Eq. (3), 
ie  represents the energy of the nodes, while ( . )d I S  is nodes and the sink distance. Each node 
transmits its calculated energy value to the neighbouring nodes closest to the sink. Each node compares 
the 
ir  of its neighbouring node with its own, and if their ir  is less than their neighbours, the node with 
the lesser energy is a normal node. 
 
Step 4: To select the cluster head, the energy consumed in each node should also be calculated in the 
fourth step, so that we could opt the node with the maximum available energy as a cluster head. For 
this purpose, we use Eq. (4): 
 
*e Q t=  (4) 
 
Finally, the nodes with the most remaining energy and the least distance to the sink are selected to be 
cluster head nodes. The cluster head selection is such that all nodes send off their remaining energy and 
distance to the nodes near the sink, nodes with the most energy introduce themselves as the cluster heads, 
informing their cluster members by sending a message. In the next section, a process is discussed to 
prevent Denial of Sleep attacks. 
 
 
 
 
4.4     Preventing Denial of Sleep attacks in ASDA-RSA  
Our proposed method is implemented on S-MAC protocol to demonstrate detection and preventing 
Denial of Sleep attacks. To prevent such attacks, we use RSA algorithm and interlock protocol to 
perform key exchange, plus a method for node authentication. The procedure to transfer the keys to 
other nodes is a vital process, since keys are prone to attacks. To protect the keys against such attacks, 
a key transfer operation is performed using an interlocking protocol, where AES algorithm is employed 
to perform key encryption. The size of the key utilised in the AES code determines the number of 
repetition cycles in the conversion, which converts the input (plain text) to the output (encoded text). 
Each iteration has several processing steps, depending on the encryption key. On the receiving nodes, a 
set of reverse cycles convert the encoded text to the original text using a similar encryption key. 
In the interlocking protocol, the locked key splits into two parts. The transmitter sends the first part of 
the key at the beginning of the process. The second part however, is transmitted when a response is 
received from the receiving node. It is apparent that the key can be decrypted at the recipient base station 
only if the two key parts are both received and joined together. To do this, the nodes connecting to the 
network must agree with the key symmetric encryption technique. In our proposed method, we employ 
AES algorithm, which divides the encryption key into two parts. For the transmitting protocol, the 
second part is transmitted, following the authentication that it is transferred to the correct nodes. In 
sensor networks, S-MAC protocols set the sleep periods. In these protocols, synchronisation signals are 
transmitted to adjust the node clocks. In these protocols, a large number of control messages, such as 
RTS and CTS, are employed, which are referred to as synchronisation packages ( SYN ). An effective 
technique to perform Denial of Sleep attacks is repeating control packets such as RTS messages, to 
prevent the nodes from going to sleep mode, resulting in waste of energy. A transmission stream of such 
messages with short intervals will not give the network nodes enough idle state time to initiate sleep 
mode, thus leading to battery power loss. While the attack is ongoing, all nodes can be affected by this 
damage. The attacker transmits SYN  messages, indicating the next sleep interval for the nodes. When 
a SYN  packet is received with similar sleep timing from another node, the upcoming sleep time is 
calculated to maintain the synchronization. In sensor networks, sleep times are not simply resettled, 
instead their times are received from the SYN packets. Eq. (5) calculates the SleepTimeNew value. 
R    e  
2
SleepTime SleepTime
ceived SYN Packet Sleep Time
New Old
 
= + 
 
 
(5) 
According to this method, sleep timing is not affected abruptly with the receipt of a SYN  message. In 
fact, this method enables gradual synchronisation for the nodes, with a similar program. A Denial of 
Sleep attack can also perform via repeating the SYN packets. The main reason is that the attacker, who 
is monitoring the network, can easily identify these packages; even if they are encrypted. To do this, 
the attacker should merely monitor all messages for their size and time. For instance, the size of S-
MAC SYN  packets are ten bytes. Plus, the framing for these packets in these S-MAC frames are mainly 
placed in the first milliseconds. If the attacker obtains this information, the package manipulation is 
accomplished regardless of its encryption. Therefore, in this paper we employ authentication to protect 
the network. In algorithm (4), the Pseudo code for our proposed ASDA-RSA schema is demonstrated.  
 
Cost analysis of the algorithm 4: In the proposed method, because of using the RSA cryptography 
algorithm, the communications between the sensors and also the packet transmissions are carried out 
with higher security. However, due to the high key length, encryption and decryption costs are high. 
Also, the authentication phase is carried out in two sensor authentication and network authentication 
phases which has a higher computational cost. But the overall computational cost of the proposed 
method is less than other methods. However, the memory usage of the proposed method is since it 
contains the packet information for authentication in the cluster and network levels along with the 
cluster information and their distance from the central sink. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5     The process of preventing Denial of Sleep attacks in ASDA-RSA 
To deploy nodes in the network and authenticate them as valid nodes, we generate public and private 
keys for communications of each sensor node. This is done using the RSA algorithm for key 
generation. The reason for the use of the RSA algorithm is that in all symmetric key encryption 
algorithms, the sender and receiver of the message should know the encryption key. When the message 
sender uses a unique and secret key for encryption, and message recipients use the same key for 
decryption, exposing a key from one of the message recipients endangers everyone's security. The 
RSA algorithm is a public key method. This method is the first trusted method among other encryption 
methods, and is one of the biggest enhancements to cryptography. In public key algorithms, two 
completely different keys are used for encryption and decryption: the public key and the private key. 
The public key is used to encrypt information, and everyone knows it, because this key is used only 
to encrypt the information and the enemies with it will not be able to decrypt the encrypted data by 
others. The private key is the key by which the encrypted data is decrypted. This key is not even known 
to friends and trustees. Thus, any network-level entity (whether user, machine, or process) requires 
two independent keys, only one of which is sensitive and must be kept secret. The nature of this 
Algorithm 4 Pseudo code for ASDA-RSA proposed schema 
1:   Step 1. Network Clustering 
2:               Create the random WSN as sensor nodes; 
3:               Define parameters of Algorithm 1 by Table 2 and Table 4; 
4:              Select the cluster head (CH); 
5:              Calculate the energy of each node; 
6:               Calculate the distance of each node; 
7:               Selecting of a node with a low distance to the base station and high energy as a CH; 
8:  Procedure Node Authentication 
9:    Step 2. Node Authentication at cluster level 
10:            Calculate Threshold; 
11:            Calculate Interval; 
12:   While Interval > Threshold   do 
13:        For All of the node at cluster level  
14:   The node is invalid (attacker node); 
15:                        For All of the node at cluster level 
16:                                                      Should be done Authentication Phase; 
17:         End for 
18:        End for 
19:            Else 
20:                       Node is Accepted 
21:            End while 
22:   Step 3. General Authentication in the Network 
23:              RSA key generation by Base Station (BS); 
24:              Key distribution using by the interlock protocol; 
25:               Node authentication is done using by node reply; 
26:  If the node is invalid then 
27:    The node is rejected. 
28:                           Else 
29:                                            The node is Accepted 
30:  End if 
31: End Procedure 
cryptographic algorithm is such that in practice the private key cannot be deduced from the public key. 
Public and private keys can be exchanged using the interlocking protocol to protect these 
communications against attacks. 
 
4.6      Node authentication at cluster level 
In our proposed method, two levels of authentication are used. One is performed by the cluster head 
to examine the node members of the cluster and the other generally by the base station. At the first 
level, we consider a threshold value for SYN  packets. During normal operation, if the SYN  is lower 
than the threshold, SYN  is used without authentication. If the threshold is exceeded, there is a 
possibility of a Denial of Sleep attack, and so the authentication must be used with SYN  authentication 
token. The SYN  package is authenticated to synchronize the active time interval when the S-MAC 
algorithm is working. The SYN  packet must carry its own identifier in the package as the first field 
and before the sleep time. The head cluster node checks with the receipt of the SYN  packet whether 
the packet sender is located in its own cluster. If the sender does not exist in this cluster, the SYN  
packet will not be accepted. This is the first level of authentication. If the initial level of authentication 
is successful, the head cluster node that is received the SYN  packet checks the node's SYN  arrival 
time interval. To do this, each head cluster node keeps the SYN  arrival time of the cluster members 
in its memory. If this interval is exceeded from the threshold, then the suspicion of a Denial of Sleep 
attack is expected. Here we cannot block the suspicious node because the attack may also have been 
carried out by an outsider who knows the node behavior and wants to disrupt our entire network 
operation by sending a packet with a different ID. In our proposed solution we go to an authentication 
mode. This mode is activated by the head cluster node, which has detected suspicious behavior due to 
the exceeding from the desired threshold. The head cluster node sends a SYN A−  packet to all cluster 
member nodes to take them to the authentication mode and forces them to send the authentication 
token in the next SYN  token. This continues until it receives the NO SYN A−  packet. A cluster 
member node can transmit it to other nodes in its cluster by receiving SYN A−  and if found it 
exceeding from the threshold. Thus, our proposed method will be able to narrow the attack range and 
make authentication only compulsory for that area. In the area where the authentication mode is 
activated, the cluster member nodes must send the SYN  packet with an authentication token to the 
head cluster. When the node is in the authentication mode if it feels that the time interval is lower than 
the desired threshold it can return to the normal mode. In this case, the NO SYN A−  packet will be 
sent to the member nodes of its cluster and will inform them that they can return to the normal mode, 
which will reduce the computational overhead. 
 
 
4.7      General authentication in the network 
Therefore, the overall process is that after performing clustering and choosing the appropriate head 
clusters and cluster-level authentication, the base station will store and have access to the information 
of all sensor nodes, including the head clusters, as well as all the lower nodes which has been received 
through head clusters. At the next level, for node authentication, the base station acts as the third party 
for the negotiations. Public and private keys created by the RSA algorithm are exchanged by the 
interlocking protocol. The sender node of sleep synchronization messages is a proxy node and the 
receiving node acts as the evaluator. Each node has a unique private key, which we refer to here as P. 
The proxy node and the evaluator node share the public key. The base station sends the public key of 
the proxy node from the base station whenever the evaluator node requests. Instead of sending a direct 
key, the base station calculates a value of F = P2 mod G. Here P is the private key and G is the public 
key. The value of F is sent whenever the evaluator requests. By receiving a node response, the key 
decrypts at the receiver base station and, if validated, the node is accepted. In the ASDA-RSA 
proposed approach, the incorrect authentication by the attacker becomes difficult and thus preventing 
Denial of Sleep attack by the attacker and changing the message or forging the SYNC message. The 
flowchart of proposed methodology is given in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 Flowchart of the ASDA-RSA proposed model 
 
 
5   Evaluating the Performance 
In the following section, the performance of our proposed ASDA-RSA approach is evaluated to prevent 
Denial of Sleep attacks. 
 
 
5.1      Performance metrics 
In this section, the effectiveness and performance of our proposed ASDA-RSA approach is thoroughly 
evaluated with comprehensive simulations. The results are compared with CrossLayer, ASDA-
BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES approaches proposed in [27, 35, 
36] and [29, 37], respectively. The average throughput, Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), network lifetime, 
detection ratio and residual energy are evaluated. Notations utilised here are listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 TABLE 1     Meaning of notations 
 
 
 
1) Average Throughput 
Average throughput is the division of the sum of packets sizes received at the destination sensor node, 
to the difference of simulation stop and start time. Eq. (10) obtains the average throughput for N 
experiments, and is calculated in Kilobits per second [38-45]. 
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2) Packet Delivery Ratio 
PDR is the division of the total data packets received at the destination sensor node, to the total 
number of data packets transmitted by the source sensor node, described in percentage. The average 
PDR obtained for N  experiments is demonstrated by Eq. (11) [31, 46-48]. 
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3) Network Lifetime 
According to the definition, the network lifetime is the elapsed time between of communication and 
sensing commencement with the receiver, and the time in which the final communication link from 
active node to the receiver is broken. Network lifetime for all active nodes currently in 
communication with the receiver is the life time aggregate for all the mentioned nodes at any time 
instance. If the network is clustered, the network lifetime is the total lifetime for all CH s. Eq. (12) 
demonstrated the calculation of the NL value. 
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4) Average Residual Energy 
As demonstrated in Eq. (13), unconsumed energy in the node in an arbitrary time instance is the 
excessive energy maintained in the node following a concluded communication with the receiver. 
Examples of residual energies are the energy for transmission, energy for reception, wasted energy 
Parameters Description 
T   Average throughput 
PDR   Packet delivery rate 
DR   Detection rate 
RE   Residual energy 
NL   Network lifetime 
iX   Demonstrate the Number of packets received by sensor node i   
iY   Demonstrate the Number of packets sent by sensor node i   
SP   Demonstrate the Size of packet (Kbps). 
PS  Denotes the Stop time of simulation 
TS  Denotes the Start time of simulation 
in the system ( sysE ), fading effects, etc. The parameters exploited for the average residual energy are 
listed in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2     Parameters used for average residual energy 
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Energy consumed during packet transmission (1 , )XET b di and packet reception ( XER ) are calculated 
using Eq. (14), and Eq. (15), respectively. 
 
.X elecER lbE=  (15) 
 
 
If
0di di , multipath fading effect occurs, and energy is wasted during transmission. However, since 
the fading scheme is out of the scope of this paper, the distance is considered to be lesser than the 
Fraunhofers distance. Moreover, the information for channel state is not considered, while 
transmission efficiency is considered to be 1. 
 
 
 
5) Detection Ratio 
As defined, detection ratio is the division of the number of misbehaving DoS nodes detected, to the 
total number of actual nodes misbehaving. In other words, detection ratio is the probability of 
successfully identifying all the security threats. Thus, the formulation is shown in Eq. (16). Table 3 
lists the parameters employed for detection rate. Therefore, the , , ,   FPR FNR TPR and TNR is defined as 
illustrated in Eq. (17), Eq. (18), Eq. (19) and Eq. (20).   
 
 
Parameters Description 
0di   Reference distance larger than the Fraunhofer-distance 
di   The distance on which the packet is transmitted 
Lb   demonstrates the number of bits per packet (BPP) 
2di   Refers to the power loss of free space channel model 
4di   Power loss of multi-path fading channel model 
elecE   Amount of energy getting dissipated during transmission or reception 
lbÎfsi   Transmission efficiency 
lbÎmpi   Condition of the channel 
 
TABLE 3     Parameters used for detection rate 
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سپ 
5.2       Simulation Setup and Comparing Algorithms 
The difficulties in implementation and debugging routing protocols in real networks, raises the 
necessity to consider simulations as a fundamental design tool. The main advantage of simulation is 
simplifying analysis and protocol verification, mainly in large-scale systems [40, 49-51]. It is possible 
to employ a NAM in the NS-2 to visualise the results. In this section, the performance of our proposed 
approach is evaluated using NS-2 as the simulation tool, and the results are discussed further [52-58]. 
Moreover, the proposed ASDA-RSA are compared with CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, 
GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models. It is worth mentioning that all ASDA-RSA, 
CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES 
parameters and settings are considered to be equal. 
 
 
5.3       Simulation results 
We have simulated ASDA-RSA approached in the NS-2 on Linux Fedora 10 [63-65]. The setting of 
simulation parameters is given in Table 4. 
 
 
Parameters Description 
( )True Positive Rate TPR   The ratio of normal sensor node that were correctly detected as a normal node. 
( )False Positive Rate FPR   The ratio of normal sensor node to total normal sensor that were mistakenly 
detected as a DoS attack. 
( )True Negative Rate TNR   Correctly rejected. The ratio of malicious sensor node that were correctly 
detected as a malicious node. 
( )False Negative Rate FNR   The ratio of malicious sensor node to total normal node that were mistakenly 
detected as a normal node. 
*  0      1 0;
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FNR All FPR FNR TPR TNR
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TABLE 4     Setting of simulation parameters 
 
 
 
Table 5-9 compares the performance of ASDA-RSA with that of CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, 
ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES in terms of average throughput, PDR, 
network lifetime, detection ratio and residual energy. 
 
TABLE 5     DR of seven approaches with varying degree of malicious sensor nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Value 
Sensor network size (m x m) 280  80 x m  
Simulation time 70 s   
Number of nodes 300   
Duty cycle 20  time slots−   
Transmission range 150 250 m−   
Packet size 512 Bytes   
RTS, CTS, ACK size 30 Bytes   
elecE  100 /nJ bit  
fsi  
220 / /pJ bit m  
mpi  
4.0015 / /pJ bit m  
The Initial energy 35 J   
The Idle power 41 mW   
The Receiving power 45 mW   
The Sleep power 25 W   
The Transmission power 41 mW   
Sensor node sensing power 85*10 J−   
                                                                           Detection rate (%)  
Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
ASDA-RSA CrossLayer ASDA-Blowfish ASDA-AES GA-DoSLD ASDA-3DES ASDA-DES 
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
0.05 98 95 93 87 85 81 78 
0.15 97 91 88 85 80 77 72 
0.25 96 85 80 77 75 70 65 
0.35 95 81 78 75 72 68 61 
0.45 94 75 73 70 65 60 54 
0.55 93 71 69 63 60 55 51 
0.65 91 68 65 58 52 47 42 
0.75 88 63 60 48 45 40 35 
 TABLE 6     T of seven approaches with varying degree of malicious sensor nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7     PDR of seven approaches with varying degree of malicious sensor nodes 
 
 
 
TABLE 8     
residualEnergy  of seven approaches with varying degree of malicious sensor node 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            Average throughput (in kbps)  
Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
ASDA-RSA CrossLayer ASDA-Blowfish ASDA-AES GA-DoSLD ASDA-3DES ASDA-DES 
0 900.85 900.85 900.85 900.85 900.85 900.85 900.85 
0.05 870.5 750.4 732 721 700.8 630 540 
0.15 835.4 610.9 600 585 580.7 502 490 
0.25 800.2 580.4 571 560 550.7 390 324 
0.35 780.9 490.3 462 448 420.03 301 287 
0.45 773.6 440 410 404 400 285 245 
0.55 760 412 400 370 350 247 218 
0.65 703 401 386 362 310 234 208 
0.75 620 380 345 327 302 218 196 
                                                                             PDR (in %)  
Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
ASDA-RSA CrossLayer ASDA-Blowfish ASDA-AES GA-DoSLD ASDA-3DES ASDA-DES 
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
0.05 94 92 90 85 82 80 78 
0.15 91 85 82 79 71 78 73 
0.25 89 81 78 71 65 75 68 
0.35 88 78 75 62 60 66 58 
0.45 85 70 66 58 55 52 50 
0.55 81 62 58 52 51 46 41 
0.65 75 58 51 48 43 40 34 
0.75 71 51 47 44 38 32 28 
                                                                              Residual energy (in %)  
Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
ASDA-RSA CrossLayer ASDA-Blowfish ASDA-AES GA-DoSLD ASDA-3DES ASDA-DES 
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
0.05 95.7 81.7 79 76 75.8 72 70 
0.15 91.4 78.4 76 72 71.8 69 68 
0.25 87.4 74.2 73 69 67.8 68 67 
0.35 82.8 71.08 69 67 65.8 64 61 
0.45 80.7 65.1 65 64.8 64.1 60 58 
0.55 77.4 60.9 60.1 59.4 58.7 54 50 
0.65 76.1 55.3 54 53 51.7 49 45 
0.75 74.3 51.7 49 47 43.9 41 40 
TABLE 9     NL of seven approaches with varying degree of malicious sensor node 
Table 10 represents average values of various frameworks for all metrics under Denial of Sleep 
attack. 
TABLE 10     Average values of various frameworks for all metrics under Denial of Sleep attack 
Schemes   Throughput  PDR   Detection rate   Residual energy  Lifetime  
 
 
 
ASDA-RSA 
 
 
Number of sensor nodes   813.681111 96.1555556 92.8388889 94.2444444 834.555556 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   782.7166667 86 94.66666667 85.08888889 888.7777778 
Simulation times   910 91.55555556 91.22222222 92.22222222 46.99 
Attack interval   659 90 94.7666667 87.6755556 868.333333 
 
 
 
CrossLayer 
Number of sensor nodes   697.1044444 91.0666667 86.6488889 86.53 566 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   551.7611111 75.22222222 81 70.93111111 708.6666667 
Simulation times   597.6666667 86.88888889 82.11111111 82.07777778 37.9 
Attack interval   387.54 83.44444444 77.1111111 77.2088889 652.333333 
 
 
 
 
ASDA-Blowfish 
Number of sensor nodes   664.8888889 89.11111111 85.33333333 84.87777778 550.2222222 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   534.0944444 71.88888889 78.44444444 69.45555556 693 
Simulation times   517.3333333 85 77.44444444 78.87777778 34.63333333 
Attack interval   335.4444444 75.22222222 75 74.64444444 639.5555556 
 
 
 
ASDA-AES 
Number of sensor nodes   653 81 84.25555556 83.64444444 539.7777778 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   519.7611111 66.55555556 73.66666667 67.57777778 664.4444444 
Simulation times   493.1111111 80.35555556 75 77.44444444 32.88888889 
Attack interval   312.5555556 72.66666667 73.94444444 73.63333333 634.4444444 
 
 
 
GA-DoSLD 
Number of sensor nodes   638.12 78.43333333 82.55 82.24444444 524.5555556 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   501.6755556 62.77777778 70.44444444 66.62222222 514.5555556 
Simulation times   459.6666667 79.11111111 73 75.78666667 31.38888889 
Attack interval   300.7133333 67.66666667 71.44444444 72.89888889 627 
 
 
 
 
ASDA-3DES 
 
 
Number of sensor nodes   368.8888889 76.22222222 80.06666667 79.84444444 481.6666667 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   411.9833333 63.22222222 66.44444444 64.11111111 469.6666667 
Simulation times   382.7777778 76.07777778 67.88888889 71.44444444s 24.35555556 
Attack interval   261.1111111 63.88888889 68.04444444 66.26666667 612.4444444 
 
 
 
ASDA-DES 
 
Number of sensor nodes   349.1111111 72.66666667 78.12222222 77.4 428.333333 
Misbehaving sensor ratio.   378.7611111 58.88888889 62 62.11111111 437.2222222 
Simulation times   329.2222222 73.73333333 60.44444444 68.77777778 19.63333333 
Attack interval   221.1111111 60.88888889 65.21111111 62.68888889 601.8888889 
                                                                               Lifetime (in sec)  
Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
ASDA-RSA CrossLayer ASDA-Blowfish ASDA-AES GA-DoSLD ASDA-3DES ASDA-DES 
0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
0.05 954 878 801 700 690 630 520 
0.15 904 790 770 680 610 500 480 
0.25 897 710 701 670 500 470 430 
0.35 887 670 660 650 450 440 400 
0.45 860 610 600 590 401 360 345 
0.55 851 590 585 580 364 339 310 
0.65 834 570 565 560 312 258 240 
0.75 812 560 555 550 304 230 210 
Figure 4 and 5, demonstrates the comparison between our proposed ASDA-RSA scheme, 
CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in 
terms of throughput in A, Number of sensor nodes. B, Misbehaving sensor ratio. C, Simulation times. 
and D, Attack interval. All frameworks are analysed against Denial of Sleep attacks in terms of 
performance. Since throughput is a vital parameter in sensor networks, we evaluated this parameter 
to evaluate our method. Since in the ASDA-RSA method the length of the encrypted key is high, it 
has caused the key not be easily broken by the attacker. Therefore, a larger number of packets reach 
the destination with unmanipulated information and no packet is eliminated. This very reason has 
increased the throughput of our method. In the ASDA-Blowfish, ASDA-AES, ASDA-3DES, and 
ASDA-DES methods, the low length of the key has made infiltrating the key easy and therefore 
decreased throughput. Plus, in Figure 4 and 5 reveals that our method performs better with different 
parameters. To provide some explanation on these results, it is worth mentioning that in our proposed 
method, the node that is selected for the cluster head is the node best in major criteria such as the 
average energy remaining and its distance to the receiver. Moreover, since the transmission power is 
set in our proposed method, the packets are guaranteed to arrive at the destination; hence, the number 
of the packets lost will be reduced, and the proposed method has a higher throughput compared to 
the current approaches. As shown in Figure 4, and 5, ASDA-RSA increases the throughput by more 
than 20%, 24%, 26%, 29%, 35% and 43% those of CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models, respectively. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Throughput: A, Number of sensor nodes; B, Misbehaving 
sensor ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Throughput: C, Simulation times; D, Attack interval. 
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Figure 6 and 7, compares our proposed ASDA-RSA scheme with CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, 
ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of PDR in A, Number of 
sensor nodes. B, Misbehaving sensor ratio. C, Simulation times. and D, Attack interval. One major 
issue raised in WSNs, which we focused on in this paper, is the node residual energy, which affects 
the network lifetime directly. As depicted in Fig. 6, the PDR in ASDA-RSA is higher compared to 
current approaches. Since the low-key length has caused the key in ASDA-Blowfish, ASDA-AES, 
ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES methods to be easily unlocked by attackers, the packets will be 
manipulated or will not reach the destination safely. Therefore, this will lead to a decrease in the PDR 
rate. As shown in Figure 6, and 7, ASDA-RSA increases the PDR by more than 8%, 11%, 13%, 18%, 
22% and 26% those of CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and 
ASDA-DES models, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of PDR: A, Number of sensor nodes; B, Misbehaving sensor 
ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, 
ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of PDR: C, Simulation times; D, Attack interval. 
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In Figure 8 and 9, comparison of our proposed ASDA-RSA framework is illustrated against current 
approaches. Figure 8A shows that for the detection rate, our proposed ASDA-RSA approach possesses 
superiority over the contemporary schemes. The main reason is that the proposed algorithm detects 
denial of sleep attack and performs isolation from the network over the attacks, thereby increasing the 
detection ratio occurring due to the denial of sleep. For instance, with the GA-DoSLD approach, the 
detection rate during denial of sleep for 100 to 200 sensor nodes is roughly 82%, with the ratio 
increasing proportional to the number of the sensor nodes. In addition, by introducing the proposed 
algorithm to the network with the same sensor nodes, the detection ratio is increased to approximately 
93 percent, compared to 87 percent for CrossLayer. The attack detection rate in ASDA-Blowfish, 
ASDA-AES, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES methods is lower due to their short key length and easily 
breakable key; because once a packet is hacked, the attacker does not give the network the chance to 
detect the attack anymore and the packet gets eliminated. In the ASDA-RSA method, because of the 
long key length, the infiltration rate of the perpetrator is lower and the key does not break easily and 
therefore, the detection rate is higher. As can be seen, ASDA-RSA algorithm increased detection ratio 
by more than 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, and 27 percent against CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, 
GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models, respectively.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, 
ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Detection rate: A, Number of sensor nodes; B, Misbehaving sensor ratio 
 
 
Figure 9C illustrates the detection rate against simulation time in the malicious nodes. What is implied here 
by simulation time is that the packets in the network are randomly transmitted among nodes at arbitrary 
times, i.e., each node transmits at a different time. Investigating the simulation time is crucial to 
understanding the ASDA-RSA performance in a Denial of Sleep attack. As indicated in the results, using 
traditional technique, the detection ratio while under Denial of Sleep attack at time 30 is around 80 percent, 
decreasing to roughly 68 percent at time 70 against simulation time. However, applying the proposed 
ASDA-RSA algorithm to the network, while evaluating simulation time, improves the network 
performance by 10 percent than that of the existing techniques at time 30, and 20 percent at time 70. Finally, 
in Figure 9D the Denial of Sleep attack detection ratio with attack intervals is demonstrated, aiming to 
investigate the ASDA-RSA flexibility in the WSN network. As can be seen, using traditional technique, 
the DoS attack detection rate with 1.5 sec intervals is approximately 65 percent, which increases to 
approximately 80 percent as the attack interval increases to 4 seconds. 
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FIGURE 9 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Detection rate: C, Simulation times; D, Attack interval. 
 
Figure 10 and 11 compares the performance of ASDA-RSA with that of CrossLayer, ASDA-
BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES for residual energy. A, Number 
of sensor nodes. B, Misbehaving sensor ratio. C, Simulation times. And D, Attack interval, 
respectively. As shown in the figure, ASDA-RSA increases the residual energy by more than 11, 14, 
15, 16, 20, and 23% those of current approaches, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 10 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Residual energy: A, Number of sensor nodes; B, 
Misbehaving sensor ratio 
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FIGURE 11 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-
DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Residual energy: C, Simulation times; D, Attack interval. 
 
Figure 12 and 13, shows the comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-
BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Lifetime. A, 
Number of sensor nodes. B, Misbehaving sensor ratio. C, Simulation times. And D, Attack interval.  
Respectively. As mentioned above, the amount of energy consumed in the network and sensor nodes 
directly affects the lifetime of the WSNs. In this study, we considered the network lifetime as the 
energy depletion of all nodes of the network. Initially, all nodes are alive and the network has a 
lifetime of 1000. Over time and energy consumption in the network and in sensor nodes, the total 
energy of the nodes in the network is terminated and the nodes die, thereby reducing the lifetime of 
the network. As you can see in Fig. 12 and 13, the proposed ASDA-RSA is better than the curent 
approaches in terms of network lifetime. In the proposed schema, the sensor node can set the best 
transmission power. In addition, by selecting the clusters head with the most remaining energy, less 
overhead and the smallest distance to the sink, the lifetime of the network has been increased. As 
shown in the Figure 12(a), and 13 ASDA-RSA increases the lifetime by more than 19, 22, 24, 28, 31, 
and 39% those of current approaches, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 12 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, 
ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Lifetime: A, Number of sensor nodes; B, Misbehaving sensor ratio 
 
 
(C) (D) 
(A) 
(B) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13 Comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, 
ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Lifetime: C, Simulation times; D, Attack interval. 
 
 
 
6     CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Various properties of wireless sensor networks like limited power source, density, low bandwidth, memory 
with small size, and limited energy make this type of network vulnerable to DoS attacks. Also, limited 
battery life has turned energy consumption into one of the main challenges in these networks. In this paper, 
the proposed ASDA-RSA schema to protect the network against DoS attack is discussed in detail. To 
reduce the energy consumed and improve the network lifetime, in ASDA-RSA a clustering approach based 
on energy and distance is used to select the proper cluster head. Plus, the RSA cryptography algorithm and 
an interlocking protocol are employed along with an authentication method to prevent DoS attacks. 
Simulation results demonstrated that the ASDA-RSA was very robust against DoS attacks. it presented that 
it has a high level of security and high average throughput (more than 29.5%), PDR (more than 16.33%), 
network lifetime (more than 27.16%), detection rate (more than 18.5%), and average residual energy (more 
than 16.5%) as compared to current approaches.  
     In this paper, we presented a method for reducing energy consumption by countering denial-of-sleep 
attacks based on cryptography and authentication. In the proposed method, all sinks were fixed and this 
(network with fixed sinks) makes the nodes adjacent to the sink act as the cluster head or an intermediary 
for the transmission of other nodes’ data to the sink. In turn, this leads to the rapid reduction of the energy 
of these nodes and therefore decreased network lifetime. to improve this matter, in future works we intend 
to use mobile sinks based on one of the meta-heuristic algorithms which is a technique for improving 
energy consumption and increasing network lifetime. 
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